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Review of Oppositions and Paradoxes: Philosophical Perplexities in Science and 
Mathematics, by John L. Bell.  Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press (2016). Paper, 
202p., $29.95.
Review by James Owen Weatherall, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, 
University of California, Irvine (weatherj@uci.edu)
The distinguished logician and philosopher of mathematics John L. Bell is best 
known for his technical work on the foundations of mathematics, particularly in the 
fields of topos theory and model theory.  The author of over a dozen books, he was 
elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada in 2009.  His Toposes and Local Set 
Theories: An Introduction (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988) is a classic 
text on the subject—so much so that it was reprinted by Dover Books in 2008 for 
mass-market consumption.  
Bell’s recent (2016) book, Oppositions and Paradoxes: Philosophical Perplexities in 
Science and Mathematics, has a different character.  Here Bell revisits some of the 
central puzzles in the history of philosophical thought – including themes, such as 
the status of infinitesimals, that Bell has returned to repeatedly throughout his 
career – from a non-technical perspective.  Readers will not find new theorems here 
(though some of the analyses Bell offers were unfamiliar to me, and edifying); 
instead, the principal contributions come in the form of clear and accessible 
exposition and sometimes surprising links drawn between different areas of inquiry.
The book consists of seven chapters and four appendices.  Its principal focus is on 
topics in late 19th and 20th century mathematics and physics, but it begins with 
much older puzzles.  The first chapter, “The Continuous and the Discrete”, treats of 
incommensurable magnitudes (as discovered by the Pythagoreans), Zeno’s 
paradoxes, and problems facing any theory of infinitesimals, among other topics.  I 
cannot speak to the historical accuracy of the discussions of Ancient philosophers, 
but the conceptual issues are treated very clearly.  The next chapter jumps ahead a
few millennia, to a subtle and engaging discussion of the classical set theoretic 
paradoxes, such as Russell’s paradox, and other foundational issues in set theory, 
such as the transfinite hierarchy and the axiom of choice.  
These two chapters are the strongest in the book, for several reasons.  They provide
novel and clear insights into truly deep conceptual problems, without introducing 
any technical apparatus.  These chapters also make a compelling case for the 
relationship between the “Oppositions” – basically, opposing concepts, such as the 
Continuous and the Discrete or the Relative and the Absolute – and the “Paradoxes”
appearing in the books title: briefly, paradoxes, Bell suggests, tend to arise when 
we are confronted with incompatible (or opposed) concepts that both seem 
essential to capturing some aspect of the world.  For instance, Bell motivates the 
paradoxes of late 19th and early 20th century set theory as arising out of attempts to
understand when “the many” may be treated as (forming) “one” entity.  The 
opposition, here, is between the Many and the One; the paradoxes, of course, arise 
because not every collection (a “many”) can be treated uniformly as a set (“one”).  
Experts in set theory are unlikely to find anything surprising in this discussion, but 
they are not the audience, and I think the way of thinking that Bell offers will appeal
to the interested novice.  
Chapter 3 covers non-Euclidean geometry.  The treatment is again perspicuous and 
accessible, but it is difficult to see how it relates to the principal themes of the book.
After all, non-Euclidean geometry is a consistent theory, and unlike (for instance) 
early axiomatizations of set theory, it was not introduced to resolve contradictions 
in a naïve theory.  This is not to say that the history of attempts to prove the 
Parallel Postulate is not philosophically rich and important; it is just less clear that 
that history is naturally conceived in terms of paradoxes or oppositions.  
Chapter 4, meanwhile, discusses time travel, mostly through a careful analysis of 
science fiction scenarios.  Here it is clear that paradoxes do arise, though Bell’s 
focus is on how some apparent paradoxes can in fact be resolved if one allows time 
to “branch” as needed.  For my own part, I would have liked to see more discussion 
of the constraints that self-consistency impose on time travel in a single “timeline” 
rather than so much attention paid to the physically (and metaphysically) ludicrous 
notion of time “splitting” merely to accommodate inconsistencies.
For roughly the first half of the book – in effect, these first four chapters – I felt that 
this would be the perfect introduction to more technical issues in philosophy (albeit 
presented at a conceptual level) for a bright high school student; it could also be 
highly appropriate for a small undergraduate seminar that could engage students 
with little background in philosophy.  The exposition is clear and accurate, and the 
issues are discussed in a compelling way.  The writing might not sustain the interest
of a reader unwilling to engage seriously with the ideas, but it would deeply reward 
the focused novice.  The final three chapters, however, struck me as much more 
problematic, and even misleading.
These chapters concern conceptual problems in 20th century physics.  Chapter 5 
covers special and general relativity; Chapter 6 is on quantum theory; and Chapter 
7 is on cosmology.  Each chapter offers a fairly standard exposition of the relevant 
physics, with a focus on thought experiments designed to highlight some of the 
ways in which these theories are surprising or counterintuitive.  For instance, 
Chapter 5 discusses the fact that according to special relativity, were one of a pair 
of twins to travel away from earth at a substantial fraction of the speed of light, and
then later return to earth, they would find themselves younger (in the sense of 
having experienced less elapsed time) than the twin who remained on earth.  
Likewise, Chapter 6 discusses, among many other things, Schrödinger’s Cat, which, 
according to some interpretations of quantum theory, would find itself in a strange 
state of being neither alive nor dead.  
The problem with these chapters is not exactly that the physics is incorrect.  Rather,
the issue is that these thought experiments are presented as paradoxes, or even 
putative paradoxes, whereas in fact they are simply novel and surprising 
predictions of contemporary physical theory.  This is not to say that there are no 
paradoxes (or inconsistencies) in modern physics – quantum theory, in particular, is 
arguably inconsistent or incomplete as formulated in many textbooks, because it 
does not clearly distinguish between when two incompatible dynamics occur – but 
rather that the mere fact that a theory defies classical expectations does not ipso 
facto render it paradoxical.  At very least, there is a world of difference between, for
instance, Russell’s paradox, which reveals a true inconsistency in informal set 
theory, and the “twin paradox”, which simply describes some consistent (and, 
apparently, true) facts about the physical world.  Labeling both as “paradoxes” in a 
book on precisely that topic is a flaw that makes the book significantly less 
attractive as recommended reading its intended audience of non-specialist readers.
